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Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in North Africa, whose
territory encompasses the coastal plain on the Atlantic, desert region of
Sahara and the Atlas mountain ranges. Morocco got independence in
1956 from French rule. It has a population of 30.1 million and the extent
of  urbanisation is 57 percent.
1  As per recent estimates, the Gender
Development Index (GDI) of Morocco is 0.616 as compared to its Human
Development Index (HDI) at 0.631.
2  The majority population of the
country is Muslim population. It is also a patriarchal society. However,
during the last few years there has been a significant attempt to change
the status of women and considerable efforts have been made to
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incorporate mainstream gender in  socio-economic policies, including
gender budgeting initiatives.
The paper analyses the scope and limitations of gender
budgeting initiatives in the context of the fiscal decentralisation process
in Morocco. Apart from the Introduction, section 2 analyses the evolution
of decentralisation in Morocco, while section 3 deals with the budgetary
reforms in Morocco through a gender lens. Sections 4 and 5 respectively
explain the future directions of local level gender responsive budgeting
and lessons drawn from the Morocco experience.
II.  Evolution of Decentralisation Process
 in Morocco
The decentralisation process in Morocco dates back to the 1960
charter, when the charter was issued recognising the need for local
governments.
3  Though limited in scope, the charter helped to constitute
the local governments.  However, it was the 1976  charter which started
the real decentralisation process.  It enshrined ‘communes’, the level of
government closest to the people, as the core of local democracy and
they were assigned a role in economic and social development.  With
this, the local government structure comprised of provinces and
prefectures and urban and rural communes. A new tier “Region” was
created in 1992 and since has a regional assembly. With the adoption of
the 1997 charter, this new tier was assigned with the main objective of
consolidating and coordinating the efforts of the provinces particularly in
planning and land use development.   The constitutional reforms in 1986
and 1992 empowered the  subnational governments to exercise a
number of legislative and administrative powers.  The  New Communal
Charter, 2001 (enacted in 2003) expanded the powers of elected
representatives to carry out local development particularly to rural
communes, control budgets and impose local taxes.
4   This also
attempted to enhance their financial powers and enabled greater
participation of citizens in the public service provision.5
Thus, the local government structure in Morocco below the
central level comprises 16 regions, 42 provinces and 28 prefectures, 249
urban communes and 1298 rural communes.  The national (central)
government has two chambers namely, the House of Representatives
and the Upper House represented by Unions, Chambers of Commerce
and representatives of local governments (Mayors).  The proportion of
local government representative in the Upper House is much larger than
others.  In the House of Representatives, 10 percent of seats are
reserved for women.
The legislative body for the Regional Council is elected through
the  electoral college and the executive head of the Region,  Wali, is
appointed by the Dahir (royal decree) from among the governors of the
prefectures or provinces within the region.  The provincial or  prefectoral
assembly is elected indirectly by the communal councillors and colleges
of professional chambers and the governor is the executive head,
appointed by the Dahir.  The legislative body for the communes are the
communal councils and the members of the council are directly elected
by a universal suffrage.  The  President of the communal council is
elected by the elected members of the council from among themselves.
Thus, ever since 1976, when communes were formed, they constitute
the basic democratic institution of decentralisation.
The communes are considered ‘core of local democracy’ and are
basic governmental units closest to the people.   They have been
assigned the responsibility of providing basic services such as providing
basic infrastructure, solid waste management, transport development
and preservation of markets, and public lighting.  Provision of other
important public services including some of the social services such as
health care and hospital services, and education are still with the central
government.
Local governments get their resources for spending from own
revenues, devolved taxes from the central government and have
recourse, to some extra-budgetary resources including loans.  There are
42 taxes assigned to the local governments and  most of these are
collected by the communes.  In terms of fiscal importance, the locally
raised revenues are not important.  Together, these constitute less than
5 percent of total receipts of the local governments.   The regions get
one percent of corporate tax and individual income tax for meeting their6
expenditures which, in the main, consists of coordination of the activities
of provinces and prefectures.
The provinces, prefectures, and communes receive 30 percent
of the value added taxes (VAT) collections.  Of the shareable proceeds,
provinces and prefectures receive 40 percent of the shareable proceeds,
the share of urban communes is 24 percent and the rural communes
receive 26 percent.  There are conditions on the spending of devolved
tax revenues.  It is stipulated that 8 percent of the proceeds should be
spent on “public goods” which benefit all citizens equally, 79 percent
should be spent on meeting operational expenditures and remaining 13
percent should be spent on investment expenditures.
The lump sum component of  distributable VAT revenues is
distributed on the basis of the ratio of personnel expenditures.  The
operational component among the provinces is distributed on the basis
of two indicators, population and the area in the ratio two-thirds, and one-
third.  The distribution of operational expenditures among communes is
done on the basis of tax effort. Investment component is distributed on
the basis of the nature of the projects.   Thus, although attempt has been
made to make the distribution formula based and transparent, there are
opaque and discretionary elements in the transfer system.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for administration,
supervision, and  coordination of local governments.  The fiscal year is
the calendar year.  The budget cycle for the local governments begins
with the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Interior in October setting
out the basic ground rules for preparing revenue and expenditure.  For
all levels except rural communes, the local budgets prepared by
respective levels of governments are sent to the Ministry of Interior after
being duly approved by the respective Councils.
5  In the case of rural
communes, the approval has to be obtained from the governor of the
province.  After approval, these are sent to the Ministry of Finance for
coordination.
Despite initiatives taken to decentralise administration, Morocco
has a highly centralised fiscal system.   Together, all local governments
incur a little over 13 percent of total expenditures or about 3.5 percent of
GDP ( Table 1 ).  Of this overwhelming proportion is financed through
transfers from above by way of shared taxes.   The share of VAT7
transfers alone constitutes almost 50 percent of the total current and
capital receipts (Table 2).
Other important local revenue sources are urban  tax ( taxe
urbaine), business tax ( patente) and supplementary urban tax ( taxe
d’edilite) ( Table 2 ). Even among these three taxes,  tax  urbaine and
patente are national taxes, assessed and collected by Central
government and are transferred (less than 10 percent collection fee) to
local governments.
6  Both these taxes constitute around 12 percent of
total receipts. Tax d’edilite is a local tax, assessed and collected by the
central government, which constitutes around 10 percent of the total
receipts. In addition to these, there are around forty local taxes and fees
assessed by local authorities, of which the major local taxes and fees are
market fees ( slaughter houses, fish, etc), forestry income, and
construction fees.  Together, these constitute a negligible proportion of
total revenues.
Table 1: Degree of Fiscal Decentralisation in Morocco




Local government expenditure/ GDP 3.38 3.48
Source: Annuaire Statistique, 2002 in Director General of Local Collectivity,
Ministry of Interior, Government of Morocco.
Even among those considered local revenues, local
governments have little freedom in setting tax rates or user fees and are
not legally responsible for tax collection.  In general the local
governments in Morocco receive almost three-fourths of their revenues
from taxes with centrally set tax rates and about 10 percent is received
by way of loans.  Thus, the share of expenditures of local governments in
the total is low and even these are financed from sources of revenue on
which the local governments have little control.     In the event, a major
advantage of decentralisation namely, varying public services according
to the preferences of the citizens, cannot simply be accomplished in the
present system (Vaillancourt, 1999).8
Table 2: Composition of Revenue of Local Government, Morocco (2002)
Sources of Revenue (%)
Recettes de fonctionnement (Revenue Receipts) 83.42
TVA Dotation (VAT transfers) 40.39
Taxes locales (local taxes) 4.23
Patente (business taxes) 8.56
Taxe urbaine (urban tax) 3.05
Taxe d' edilite (supplementary urban tax) 10.09
Autres recettes (others) 17.11
Recettes d'equipement (Capital Receipts) 16.58
TVA Dotation Transfert (VAT transfers) 8.30
Emprunts (loan) 8.28
Recettes  totales (total receipts) 100
(14480)
Note:     Amount in parentheses is in millions of Moroccan Dirhams.
Source: Director General of Local Collectivity, Ministry of Interior, Government of
Morocco.
As already mentioned, local governments in Morocco have been
entitled to receive at least 30 percent of national VAT receipts since mid-
eighties. VAT transfers were divided into current and capital transfers.
Current transfers were calculated (till 1995) as budget balancing grants.
However, in the light of disincentives associated with  gap filling method
of transfers resulting in widening deficits; in 1996, a transfer formula was
set in place for the allocation of 30 percent VAT transfers devolved to
local governments. This formula-based apportionment system of
transfers is as follows.  The 30 percent of devolved 30 percent VAT
transfers are reserved for transferred charges [15 percent], common
charges [10 percent] and adjustment fund [5 percent], that is,
unexpected expenditure like natural calamities; (c) remaining 70 percent
is allocated for urban municipalities and communes, rural municipalities
and provinces and prefectures with 30 percent, 20 percent and 20
percent respectively. The urban municipalities and communes and rural
municipalities funds are allocated according to the weighted sum of three
criteria given in Table 3.9
Table 3: Criteria for Allocation
Urban Municipalities






Tax Effort 15 15
Source: Director General of Local Collectivity, Ministry of Interior, Government of
Morocco.
While the allocation of funds for Provinces and Prefectures (PP)
is follows: Each PP receives its 1995 wage bill. The sum of these wage
bills is subtracted from the total funds received (20 percent) and the
remainder of 20 percent is allocated using weighted criteria of area and
population of provinces and prefectures (Vaillancourt, 1999). The point to
be noted here is that the Moroccan system of fiscal transfers partially
takes care of imbalances in the fiscal potential and favours poorer
regions through assigning comparatively higher weight to fiscal
equalisation. The condition of women is expected to be worse in poorer
regions and states. Therefore, equalising transfers help to provide larger
outlay for programmes and policies with larger content for women’s
empowerment. Rational fiscal equalisation transfers will enhance gender
equity.
Yet another point to be noted is that the composition of revenue
across each type of local government in Morocco differs. It is revealed
from Table  5  that provinces and prefectures depend heavily on fiscal
transfers (at around 90 percent of the total revenue), while urban
communes get a comparatively greater share from their revenues than
from transfers. The loan component is highest in case of rural
communes. Fiscalite consist of the taxes like  tax  urbaine,  patente, tax
d’edilite etc.10
Table 4: Composition of Revenue within each Type of Local
























































Note:      Amount in parentheses is in percent.
Source:   Director General of Local Collectivity, Ministry of Interior, Government
of Morocco.
In terms of functional devolution, the Moroccan local
governments are assigned functions of street lighting, road infrastructure,
garbage collection and treatment, markets and slaughterhouses, urban
transit, water and sewers, etc.  Expenditure by function data is not
readily available across local governments. However, in terms of
expenditure of local governments by economic classification, it is
revealed that rural and urban communes (26.4 and 56.9 percent
respectively) incur considerable expenditure when compared to regions
and prefectures and provinces (last row in  Table 5 ).  Of the total
expenditure of local bodies, 87.31 percent is revenue expenditure and
only 12.69 percent is the capital expenditure. However, it is to be noted
that capital expenditure at levels of prefectures, provinces, and urban
communes are comparatively negligible.  Within revenue expenditure,
wages and salaries constitute a significant part of the expenditure in local
bodies.11




















59.76 94.21 93.08 77.70 87.31
Charges du personnel
(Wages and Salaries)






1.18 1.95 14.31 3.34 9.31
Excedent previsionnel 40.10 8.06 8.21 21.75 13.53
Autres depenses
(others)




40.24 5.79 6.92 22.30 12.69
Acquisitions mobilieres
(mobile acquisitions)
1.31 1.37 0.99 2.65 1.49
Travaux Neufs et (new
works)
17.43 3.71 5.20 15.24 8.36
Gross reparations (gross
repair)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
quisitions immobilieres
(immobile acquisitions)
0.13 0.13 0.51 0.27 0.38
Autres depenses
(others)
21.36 0.59 0.22 4.13 2.46












Expenditure as percent of
all local bodies
5.5% 11.1% 56.9% 26.4% 100.0%
Note:      Amount in parentheses is in millions of Moroccan Dirhams.
Source:   Director General of Local Collectivity, Ministry of Interior, Government of
Morocco
It would be useful to summarise the important characteristics of
fiscal decentralisation in Morocco.  The important desirable features of
the system include stability in the assignment and transfer system. The
fact that the transfer system is formula-based, particularly the VAT12
transfers for current purposes are distributed according to formula and it
also has a significant  equalisation element in the transfer system.
Equally important is the feature of devolution of powers according to the
capacity of local governments to manage them.  Thus, rural communes
which do not have high capacity to plan and design various public
services are not given as much powers as urban communes.   Not
surprisingly, rural communes have to work within the administrative
control of Ministry of Interior, which helps them to design and implement
public service delivery and formulate their annual budgets.   It is also
notable that fiscal reform has  privatised the delivery of many of the
services such as, water supply and power instead of decentralising them.
Despite these significant features of decentralisation, it is
important to note that the fiscal system in Morocco is that local
governments have very limited role.   Even though there has been formal
devolution of functions to the local bodies in Morocco in the backdrop of
the New Communal Charter, elements of centralisation are evident as
local governments remain under the supervision of Ministry of Interior.
The level of spending by the local governments is so low that they
cannot make much difference to providing access, ensuring entitlements
or enabling empowerment of women, however well disposed they are,
towards achieving gender equity and mainstreaming women in organised
economic activities.
Nor is the sensitivity to gender issues in Morocco at the local
level high enough to make significant difference to improve equity.
There is no systematic attempt to mainstream gender approach in local
budgets.  There is no strategic planning to sensitise and educate the
policy makers on gender equity.  The stakeholders of local governments
too are not well informed about the issues of gender sensitivity to make
any significant impact on policies.  Given the traditional nature of society
with significant gender inequity, the approach continues to confine
women to traditional roles.
There is an initiative taken to analyse the local budgetary
process, planning and implementation on the one hand, and the extent of
gender equity accomplished in them by the UNIFEM in collaboration with
UNICEF in the 5 communes to initiate gender sensitive analysis of local
budgets and assess the potential of gender mainstreaming in the local
budgetary process on the other.   The five communes included for the
study are, Casablanca city council and urban commune of Sidi Moumen,13
one urban and rural commune each in  Essaouira, a rural commune of
Mohemmadia and rural commune of  Zagora. The study is expected to
help stakeholders of these communes to develop  budget engendering
strategies in them.
III.  Budgetary Reform and Engendering
Budgetary Policy in Morocco
There has been a significant reform of budgetary policies in
Morocco during the last three years.  These reforms focused on four
important initiatives and these include: ( i) introduction of performance
budgeting; (ii) contracting out services in the interest of efficiency; and
(iii) partnership of the government and imparting responsiveness for
gender concerns in budgeting.  All these are complimentary as they
attempt to shift the focus to the transformation of expenditures into
outputs and outcomes, improve efficiency in public service delivery
through the involvement of the private sector and competition wherever
feasible, and by fostering partnerships with self-help groups and non-
governmental organisations, and targeting public services to achieve
gender equity.
Focus on gender equity in budgetary decisions is in part the
result of the enlightened policy from above strengthened by the
advocacy done by women’s groups.   Since 1998, there has been
considerable affirmative action in regard to mainstreaming women.  The
King has taken considerable initiative to address women’s issues. And
as he is the religious authority, his initiative has given significant impetus
to women’s movement.  Noteworthy among the initiatives is the  family
code, which has expanded the scope of women considerably woven in a
traditional society.  The strong advocacy that accompanied the sovereign
initiative helped to spread advocacy effectively.  In fact, Morocco has the
first women’s newspaper.  There are a number of very active  NGOs,
which are part of the movement for democratic movement.  They are
active in educational activities, women’s rights, legal issues, literature,
promotion of social, economic and income generating activities, and in
preventing violence against women.  In the democratic transition since
1998, women’s movement has carved out a niche in improving the status14
of women in the society in general.   One important initiative in this
regard is in sensitising the women’s concerns in the budgets.
The approach to gender sensitive budgeting was formulation and
implementation of budget by choosing performance indicators to achieve
gender equity and evolve a strategic plan to work towards achieving
them. In the Department of Education and Training, the exercise began
in 2000 by sensitising gender issues.
7  The major objectives set out were
(i)  universalisation of education with thrust given to female education
particularly in rural areas; (ii) improving the quality of education and
opening up private educational institution in line with the needs and
requirements; and (iii) enhance governance in the delivery of education
services through improved management, introducing systems and
procedures, and instituting regulatory systems.  Thus gender
responsiveness in budgetary decisions in Morocco has been derived as
a component for identifying performance indicators for assessing
progress.
At present, the enrolment ratio of 79 percent for Morocco in 2000
for children in the age group 6-11, hides the existence of the wide rural-
urban disparities and differences among male and female children.  The
strategic planning and provision of complimentary services in villages
such as rural water supply and improvement in connectivity increased
the rural female enrolment sharply by almost 20 percentage points to 82
percent in just two years.  At this rate, the goal of achieving universal
enrolment by 2010 may not be difficult to achieve.
The process of gender sensitising the budgets in Morocco, thus
started at the central level by identifying the programmes that help
women, specifying the objectives in terms of performance indicators, and
incorporating them in the annual budgets. Besides, the Ministry of
Education, the process has been initiated in finance, health, and
agriculture ministries and it is also in the process of being extended to 9
other ministries in the near future.  The gender responsive budgeting
predominantly covers social sectors which constitute about 40 percent of
the central budget.   This also is being extended to 13 other
departments.  Furthermore, there are plans to extend this process to
regional, provincial, and commune levels.  However, the process of
preparing the programmes, fixing specific performance indicators to fix
targets and incorporating them in the annual budget are major
challenges that will have to be met in the future.15
While considerable effort has gone into gender sensitising
budgetary decisions at the central level, enormous distance is yet to be
traversed in ensuring gender equity at the local level.  The analysis of
local budgetary process of formulation and implementation has brought
out numerous areas for future action.  As already mentioned, the shares
of local budget in total, both in raising revenues and implementing
expenditure programmes are just about 10 percent.  To be effective, it is
the local level that has comparative advantage in identifying the
programmes that can help to empower women and bring them into the
mainstream of economic activity.  Besides, much of the focus of  NGOs
and civil society organisations revolves around central rather than local
budgetary policies.  As mentioned earlier, the UNIFEM initiative along
with UNICEF to study the budget engendering strategy in 5 communes is
likely to help draw strategic plans in the future, but the initiative is small,
only at the beginning, and for the present, gender sensitisation at the
local level does not look very promising.
The analysis of gender sensitisation of budgets has brought to
the fore a number of important areas where initiative is required.  Firstly,
there are very few females among the elected legislators and executives
at the local level.    Secondly, there is very low awareness of gender
issues and lack of sensitivity in legal, normative, as well as regulatory
framework at local level.  Nor is there much information and analysis to
help prioritisation of the programmes, preparation of budgets that would
help to mainstream women, and help in their effective implementation.
Thirdly, there is little co-ordination and sequencing of activities among
the multiple players in pursuing the objective of gender mainstreaming.
Fourth, information and data available to develop indicators for gender
inclusion in the choice of projects is scanty.  Fifth, there is much to be
done to have more and better organised advocacy, education, and
capacity building of women’s organisations and  coordinated action for
strategising gender equity in budget decisions.  Finally, it is necessary to
undertake significant initiatives to undertake gender sensitive analysis of
social impact of public investments.   Thus, considerable initiatives and
effort both in terms of building awareness and advocacy on the one hand
and compiling a wealth of information and data are necessary for
engendering the budget formulation and implementation at the local level
in Morocco.16
IV.  Future Directions for LLGRB
There is a clear dilemma as to whether the focus of gender
responsiveness to budgetary decisions should be to expand the scope at
the central level and should it shift to local level.  Given the advantages
of lower information and transaction costs at the local level, it would
seem appropriate that the strategy for improving gender equity should be
two pronged.  The first is to increase the degree of decentralisation and
devolve powers to deliver important social services to the communes.
The second is to increase the responsiveness of local budgeting through
awareness, advocacy and capacity building.  Thus, strategy for
effectively improving gender responsiveness of budgetary decisions
includes attempts to increase the role of communes in providing public
services and sensitising them to incorporate programs that would help to
bring women into the mainstream of economic activity, setting
implementable targets and strategically implement them to achieve the
targets within the given time horizon.
Thus, an important strategy needed to bring about gender equity
in budgetary decisions effectively is to effectively orient policies towards
furthering the process of fiscal decentralisation, particularly in the
provision of education, healthcare, water supply and sanitation and other
important merit good type of public services, besides maintaining the law
and order and protecting property rights.  It is also important to devolve
revenue raising responsibilities to link expenditure functions at the
margin.
The process of increasing decentralisation also entails evolving
the intergovernmental transfer system on more scientific lines.  The
transfer system should contain an optimal mix of both general purpose
and specific purpose transfers.  While the objective of the former is to
enable all local governments to provide a given normative level of public
services so long as they raise resources from own sources at a
prescribed effective tax rate.  The objective of the specific purpose
transfers is to ensure minimum standards of the specified meritorious
services, particularly in respect of services where gender sensitivity is
important. The eagerness to impart gender sensitivity to budgetary
decisions should not lead to imparting complexity in the transfer system.17
The transfer system should be simple, transparent, equitable, and should
incorporate right kind of incentives.
Advocacy to improve gender responsiveness in budgetary policy
is extremely important.  This has to be done at both central and local
levels.  While there has been considerable progress in budget decision
at the central level, greater effectiveness and targeting of public services
would require decentralisation and therefore, improving advocacy at local
levels is extremely important to impart gender sensitivity to local budgets.
V.  Lessons from Moroccan Experience
Morocco’s limited experience with gender responsive budgeting
provides some important lessons.  The first important lesson is that
gender responsive budgeting has a better chance of success in an
enabling environment and when calibrated with other complimentary
policies than those undertaken in isolation.  The proactive role of the
King and the Prime Minister in hastening the process of change in the
role and place of women in society has provided a favourable climate for
gender responsive budgeting.
Second, imparting gender responsiveness in budgeting is much
more important at the central level in countries, which are unitary and
highly centralised.  Rather than waiting for decentralisation to take place
to make the progression to gender equity, it would be desirable to
sensitise budget making for gender concerns at the central level itself.
Indeed, in a large country, efficiency and targeting of public service
delivery can be done at the local level, but there is no need to wait for
decentralisation to take place for rendering budgets gender responsive.
At the same time, there are limits up to which this can succeed in
ensuring gender equity and the decentralisation reform will have to be
calibrated alongside.
The experience of Morocco also brings out the importance of
NGOs and advocacy groups in gender responsive budgeting.  Even in a
conservative society, the advocacy groups have attempted to ensure
gender equity in public services.  Interestingly, advocacy groups and
NGOs work where money is spent but do little to change the18
assignments.  Thus, although many public services in Morocco could be
provided at local levels, the centre continues to provide them and
advocacy groups work to achieve gender equity within this context.1920
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Endnotes
                                                                
1 World Development Indicators, 2005.
2 Data relates to 2003. For details on HDI and GDI, refer the technical notes in
UNDP, Human Development Report, 2005.
3 Strictly speaking, the Dahir of 1963 spelt out the regulation concerning the
provinces and prefectures.
4 The assigned responsibilities of the communes provided by the new charter are
the following: urban and land use planning; hygiene, sanitation and environment;
economic and social development; local public services and community services;
socio-cultural equipment and actions; co-operation, association and partnership
and finance; taxation and town lands.
5 The local elected communes have the power to vote the budget and there exist
a small share of women in these legislative and executive processes.
6 Two taxes (tax urbaine and tax d’edilite) are assessed on a rental value (valeur
locative) of taxable units.
7 Strictly speaking, the Moroccan experience started in 2001/2 with the gender
analysis of the Moroccan budget as a component of a Public Expenditure Review
(PER) supported by the World Bank.  By the end of 2002, after a formal
presentation of the findings and recommendations of the report, the leading
stakeholders in the Directorate of Budget and the Chief of Cabinet in the Ministry
of Finance set about exploring the follow-up, which was eventually undertaken
under the umbrella of the Global UNIFEM GRB Initiative. The follow-up of this
exercise with UNIFEM support, was in the form of sensitisation of policymakers
and capacity development of key budget management professionals of the
ministries of education, health, agriculture, equipment and their counterparts in the
Directorate of Budget (DB) of the Ministry of Finance. This is the process which
led to the adoption of GRB as a key component of the budgetary and broader
reform process (excerpts of comments from UNIFEM).